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Abstract 
 
Leximetric data coding techniques aim to measure cross-national and inter-temporal 
variations in the content of legal rules, thereby facilitating statistical analysis of legal systems 
and their social and economic impacts.   In this paper we explain how leximetric methods 
were used to create the CBR Labour Index (CBR-LRI), an index and related dataset of labour 
laws from around the world spanning the period from 1970 to 2013.  Datasets of this kind 
must, we suggest, observe certain conventions of transparency and validity if they are to be 
usable in statistical analysis.  The theoretical framework informing the construction of the 
dataset and the types of questions which it is are designed to answer should be made explicit.  
Then the choices involved in the selection of indicators, the definition of coding algorithms, 
and the aggregation and weighting of data to create composite measures, must be spelled out.  
In addition, primary legal sources should be referenced, and it should be clear how they were 
used to generate reported values.  With these points in mind we provide an overview of the 
CBR-LRI dataset’s main features and structure, discuss issues of weighting, and present some 
initial findings on what it reveals of global trends in labour regulation. 
 
Keywords: empirical legal studies, quantitative labour law, leximetrics, index construction, 
construct validity. 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we present first results from analysis of a new dataset which codes for changes 
in labour laws around the world over the period 1970-2013.  The dataset is based on the CBR 
Labour Regulation Index (‘CBR-LRI’) and is one of a number of datasets created through the 
collaborative efforts of an international team of researchers based principally at the Centre for 
Business Research in Cambridge. From 2005, the work began of building a statistical picture 
of changes occurring across a number of areas of labour law, namely the laws governing the 
definition of the employment relationship, working time, dismissal protection, employee 
representation, and industrial action.  This project was initially a response to the 
quantification of labour law rules attempted by the research team responsible for the 
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development of the legal origin hypothesis,1 and to the related emergence of the World 
Bank’s Doing Business indicators.2  As the project advanced it also addressed issues raised in 
similar initiatives undertaken by the OECD3 and the ILO.4  In 2007 data covering five 
countries were published.5  In 2016 a much expanded version of the dataset was completed,6 
covering 117 countries which together represent over 95 per cent of world GDP.7  In this 
paper we explain how this much more extensive dataset was constructed, and give a more 
complete account than in our earlier work of methodological issues affecting indices which 
purport to measure labour regulation. 
 
As Saltelli and Funtowicz argue,8 stringent criteria of transparency should be adopted if 
composite indicators of this kind are to be used to generate research results and drive policy 
outcomes.  With this point in mind, we have published the dataset in a form which records 
the score for each individual variable for every country on a year by year basis.  This level of 
disaggregation enables other researchers to see exactly how composite scores are arrived at. 
We have also published a codebook and metadata which provide an explanation for every 
single piece of coding and which supplies a reference to the primary legal sources on which 
every value in the dataset is based.9 Failure to open up the black box of index construction 
has, in the past, led to scepticism towards the use of quantitative measures of legal-
institutional phenomena.10  We aim to address these concerns by adopting an approach based 
on maximum transparency in the presentation of the coding process, at the same time as 
making our data fully available to other researchers and research users, on an open-access 
basis.  
 
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. In section 2 we briefly review arguments 
concerning the relevance and validity of quantitative empirical approaches to labour law 
research. In section 3 we identify some preliminary methodological issues concerning the 
                                                          
1 J. Botero, S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer The regulation of labor 119 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1340 (2004). 
2 World Bank, Doing Business 2004: Understanding Regulations (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2003). 
3  D Grubb and W. Wells, Employment regulation and patterns of work in OECD countries 21 OECD 
Economic Studies 7 (1993); D. Venn, Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating 
the OECD employment protection indicators OECD Working Paper (2009), available at 
www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers/, accessed 10 December 2016; OECD, Employment Outlook 
(OECD, 2004); Employment Outlook (OECD, 2013). 
4  ILO, Employment protection legislation: summary indicators in the area of terminating regular 
contracts (individual dismissals) (ILO, 2014), available at  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---
travail/documents/publication/wcms_357390.pdf (accessed 10 December 2016). 
5 S. Deakin, P. Lele and M. Siems, The evolution of labour law: calibrating and comparing 
regulatory regimes 146 International Labour Review 133 (2007). 
6 Z. Adams, L. Bishop and S. Deakin, CBR Labour Regulation Index (Dataset of 117 Countries), in J. 
Armour, S. Deakin and M. Siems (eds.) CBR Leximetric Datasets 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17863/CAM.506 (University of Cambridge Data Repository), accessed 10 
December 2016. 
7  The countries in the CBR-LRI dataset accounted for 95.03% of GDP in 2014: 
https://www.quandl.com/collections/economics/gdp-by-country (accessed 10 December 2016). 
8  A. Saltelli and S. Funtowicz, When all models are wrong 30(2) Issues in Science and Technology 
(Winter 2014), http://issues.org/30-2/andrea/, accessed 10 December 2016. 
9  Adams et al., CBR Labour Regulation Index, n. 6 above. 
10  C. McCrudden, Legal research and the social sciences 122 Law Quarterly Review 632 (2006). 
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criteria by which the construction of composite indices should be judged (‘construct 
validity’). In section 4 we explore the theoretical priors underlying the construction of the 
dataset, clarifying what exactly it is we are measuring.  In section 5 we provide an account of 
the ‘leximetric’ coding method we adopted.  We explain how we used a textual approach 
based on content analysis to code for differences in the strength of protective labour law 
regulation, distinguishing this from methods which rely on surveys and expert submissions to 
generate leximetric data.  In this part we also explain in detail the choices underlying the 
indicators and coding algorithms used in the construction of the dataset.  In section 6 we 
examine the statistical properties of the dataset, looking in particular at issues of weighting 
and aggregation, and we discuss ways in which it might be used in econometric analysis.  
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Quantifying labour law: justifications and limits 
 
2.1 Arguments for and against empirical legal research in general 
 
Labour law is a field which has been shaped by interactions with the social sciences, and in 
particular empirical sociology, practically since its inception (Hepple, 1986).11  Labour 
lawyers can hardly be unaware of the importance of locating legal analysis in the wider 
context of developments in the labour market and in the system of industrial relations.  This 
is hard-wired into our field because of the influence of the founders of the discipline. While 
Kahn-Freund urged labour lawyers to go ‘through’ not ‘round’ the law – in other words, not 
to neglect conceptual and doctrinal analysis of the kind which forms the core of interpretive 
legal method12 – his entire analysis of both British and comparative labour law was premised 
on the need to understand labour law as just one form of regulation among many.13 This 
approach invites, or perhaps even requires, labour lawyers to become familiar with the 
operation not just of the system of collective bargaining, which was Kahn-Freund’s focus, but 
with a wider range of institutional forces shaping the way that labour is contracted on both 
the supply side (such as the household division of labour, the tax-benefit system, vocational 
education and training, and migration) and the demand side (such as macroeconomic policy, 
enterprise form, and industrial structure).14   
 
While it is one thing for labour lawyers to familiarise themselves with what social scientists 
have to say about phenomena beyond the legal system, it could be argued that it is another 
thing altogether for them to engage directly in research which uses the models and empirical 
methods of the social sciences to examine those phenomena.  In practice, however, this 
concern has not stopped labour lawyers engaging in theoretical or empirical social science 
research, any more than analogous concerns about disciplinary boundaries have prevented 
economists and sociologists from analysing the operation and effects of labour laws.15  Core 
                                                          
11  B. Hepple,‘Introduction’, in B.  Hepple (ed.) The Making of Labour Law in Europe (Mansell, 
1986).  
12 O. Kahn-Freund, Reflections on legal education 29 Modern Law Review 121 (1966). 
13 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal framework’, in A. Flanders and H. Clegg (eds.) The System of Industrial 
Relations in Britain (Blackwell, 1954).  
14  C. Arup, P. Gahan, J. Howe, R. Johnstone, R Mitchell and A. O’Donnell (eds.) Labour Law and 
Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, Constitution and Regulation of Labour 
Markets (Federation Press, 2006). 
15 For an overview of both types of empirical labour law research, see S. Deakin, ‘Labor and 
employment laws’, in P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal 
Research (OUP, 2010). 
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techniques of empirical social science research, such as surveys, interview-based fieldwork, 
dataset construction and statistical analysis of data, are generic methods, not confined to a 
single discipline; they can be accessed by lawyers just as well as by economists and 
sociologists, and are increasingly taught to doctoral and other graduate-level students as part 
of integrated research methods courses.   
 
There is, moreover, a case for saying that the critical questions facing labour law today, as a 
mode of regulation and as a disciplinary field, cannot be answered except through a 
combination of interpretive and empirical analyses. If we want to come to a fully-rounded 
view, for example, on whether the concept of the contract of employment is or is not well 
suited to a changing technological, organisational and labour market context,16 we cannot 
confine ourselves to a doctrinal analysis of labour law rules: additional theories and 
techniques are needed in order for us firstly to conceptualise the nature of causal relations 
between different legal and socio-economic variables, and then to gain some understanding 
of how those linkages are playing out in practice. 
 
Those trying to answer these questions increasingly do so through the construction of multi-
member teams which cross disciplinary boundaries. Thus labour lawyers are finding 
themselves working directly with economists or sociologists on particular projects,17 or 
contributing to edited volumes with a common theme.18 This is happening, we might 
reasonably infer, because lawyers have knowledge of institutional processes and skills of 
legal interpretation which usefully complement the data-gathering and statistical skills of 
social scientists.19 
 
2.2 Arguments for and against quantitative legal research 
 
We do not think that these arguments in favour of the involvement of labour lawyers in 
empirical research projects lose any of their force merely because the research is quantitative 
as opposed to qualitative.  Conducting interview-based fieldwork requires researchers to 
acquire skills which are just as specialised as those needed for quantitative work.20  Lawyers 
are trained in textual interpretation, not for research in the field.  Thus there is no justification 
that we can see for labour lawyers prioritising qualitative over quantitative research simply 
on the basis of their own disciplinary training. 
 
A somewhat different argument about the limits of quantitative approaches to legal research 
turns on the view that mathematical models assume a rigidly deterministic relationship 
between variables which is at odds with the open, dynamic nature of social systems in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
16  As addressed, for example, by K. Stone and H. Arthurs (eds), Rethinking Workplace Regulation: 
Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment (Russell Sage Foundation, 2013).  
17   See, for example, P. Gahan, R. Mitchell, S. Cooney, A. Steward and B. Cooper, Economic 
globalization and convergence in labor market regulation: an empirical assessment 40 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 703 (2012). 
18  For example, Stone and Arthurs, Rethinking Workplace Regulation, op. cit., n. 16. 
19  Our own project is interdisciplinary in this sense: Adams, Bishop and Deakin are lawyers; Bastani 
is an economist. The dataset was constructed as part of a series of wider projects involving a number 
of lawyers, sociologists and economists. See http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/datasets/. 
20  See A. Poteete, M. Janssen and E. Ostrom, Working Together: Collective Action, The Commons, 
and Multiple Methods in Practice (Princeton University Press, 2010) 
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general,21 and a fortiori with the open-textured and indeterminate nature of legal rules, not 
least those of labour law.22 This is a more weighty objection to quantitative legal research, 
but we think that would be going much too far to take it to the point of rejecting all uses of 
statistical and mathematical approaches to empirical legal analysis. The issue, rather, is to 
understand what quantitative methods can achieve, and not to push them beyond their 
inherent limits. 
 
Constructing a labour law index could have a number of purposes. It can, as we aim to show 
below, clarify trends and patterns which are otherwise obscured by the sheer volume and 
complexity of legal texts.  It can thereby contribute not only to improved understandings of 
social phenomena, but to better policy. 
 
Index construction is nothing new for social policy.  At the end of the nineteenth century, 
social researchers such as Booth and Rowntree developed a concept of ‘poverty’ based on 
empirical studies of household expenditure which not only revealed for the first time the huge 
extent of destitution among the working poor of major British cities, but went on to shape the 
emerging institutions of the welfare state.23 Their measures of poverty were ‘constructs’ 
which abstracted from a more messy and complex reality, but this is true of statistical 
categories in general.  Without such categories, mapping phenomena such as household 
poverty would be impossible; and without this mapping, it would not have been possible to 
build the institutions of the welfare state as we know them.24   
 
Extending the techniques of index construction to aspects of the legal system does not seem 
to us to be a step too far.  There is no reason in principle for regarding legal rules and 
institutions as beyond the scope of statistical categorisation. The issue is whether the process 
of building an index can be justified using generally accepted statistical conventions, 
including those relating to ‘construct validity’, which we explore in more detail below (see 
sections 3-5). 
 
Index construction is also undertaken in order to facilitate econometric analysis, that is, 
statistical analysis which tests economic hypotheses and claims.  We do not hold the view 
that econometrics has the answers to everything or that it is always the best method to use.  It 
is one technique among many and care should be taken to use it appropriately. 
 
Econometric analyses are often presented on the basis that they disclose general relationships 
between variables which interact in a predictable and determinate way.  In practice, however, 
complex phenomena such as inequality and productivity are affected by multiple factors 
which interact in different ways according to the context being considered. There is a danger, 
then, in treating isolated statistical correlations as evidence of general trends.25   
 
This danger is heightened in the charged normative context of labour law rules, which, by 
their nature, involve the distribution of power and resources, and so are politically contested.  
It would be wrong to ignore the risk of econometric analysis being used to lend false 
                                                          
21  T. Lawson, Economics and Reality (Routledge, 1997). 
22  J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (University of Massachusetts Press, 
1983). 
23  A. Briggs, Social Thought and Social Action: A Study of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree 
(Longmans, 1961).  
24  K. Williams, From Pauperism to Poverty (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). 
25  Poteete et al., Working Together, op. cit. n. 20, at pp. 9-10. 
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scientific weight to what are, in essence, political claims about the desirability or otherwise of 
particular labour law rules. 
 
Our view on this issue is that it is no more appropriate to reject quantitative analysis out of 
hand than it is any other empirical method.  The issue, in each case, is whether the method 
used is appropriate for answering the question which is being addressed.  Where data are 
scarce, hard to retrieve and non-comparable, quantitative analysis may be inappropriate. Even 
where good data are available, statistical associations may represent spurious correlations 
which are a feature of the way data are collected rather than any real underlying phenomenon.  
In complex multivariate environments, regression techniques may simply not be up to the 
task of identifying causal relationships.26  
 
However, other methods also have their limitations.  Doctrinal analysis of legal rules, while it 
may elucidate the meaning of texts and provide some indication of how they will be applied 
by legal actors, tells us next to nothing of the way those rules shape social and economic 
relationships beyond the sphere of operation of the legal system.  Qualitative interviewing, by 
its nature, is often non-replicable (interviews in a given time and place may be so context-
specific that they cannot be repeated) and hence may lack the condition of external validity 
which should ideally characterise empirical research.27  Multiple-methods approaches 
combining quantitative and qualitative techniques, and overcoming the limitations of each, 
may currently be the state of the art in the social sciences, but using more than one method is 
no guarantee of success in a project.  Thus it seems to us likely that quantitative approaches, 
either singly or in combination with other methods according to the needs of particular 
projects, will help us obtain a better understanding of the social and economic operation of 
labour law systems.  
 
A final objection to our project could be that it is pointless to seek replicate the attempts of 
previous researchers, including those working for international organisations, at index 
construction, given that several such indices already exist.  As we have seen, these include 
the indices developed by the legal origin research team,28 the World Bank,29 and the OECD.30   
 
One of the motivations of our project was not simply to replicate these earlier studies 
(although replication is an important and currently under-valued aspect of social science 
research) but to improve on them.  These other indices are, in various ways, partial in their 
coverage of labour law systems, by reference to the scope of rules covered, and to the periods 
of time coded for. They also, as we shall see (section 4, below), have built into them 
theoretical assumptions which are open to question.  We could have confined our analysis to 
a critique of these other indices, but this would not have offered a good defence to the 
argument that they are the best that there is.  Thus in this paper we show how an index can 
be, and has been, constructed, in ways which seek to address the limitations of these previous 
attempts.  
 
3. Leximetric data coding: elements of construct validity 
 
                                                          
26  Ibid., at pp. 13-15. 
27  Ibid., at p. 12. 
28  Botero et al., The regulation of labor, op. cit. n.1. 
29  World Bank, Doing Business 2004, op. cit. n. 2. 
30  OECD, Employment Outlook, op. cit. n. 3.  
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We constructed the CBR-LRI dataset using a methodology which has come to be known as 
‘leximetrics’.  The term ‘leximetrics’ can be used to refer to any quantitative analysis of 
law,31 but it also refers more precisely to the process of translating legal materials, principally 
texts of statutes, decrees and judgments, into a form which can be used in statistical 
analysis.32    
 
Leximetric data coding seeks to capture in quantitative form features of legal systems which 
are not naturally expressed in that form.  In the social science literature on index construction, 
a quantitative measure of this kind is known as a ‘construct’ which aims to capture an 
underlying ‘concept’, and there is a growing literature discussing the conditions for ‘construct 
validity’, that is to say, the requirements which such indices must meet to be regarded as 
reliable measures.33  The Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators prepared jointly 
by the OECD and the European Commission in 2008 suggests that developing an index is 
akin to building a computational model and as such ‘owes more to the craftsmanship of the 
modeller than to universally accepted scientific rules for encoding’.34  The Handbook makes 
a series of recommendations on index construction which emphasise the importance of 
arriving at an appropriate theoretical framework, which is used to inform the selection of 
indicators and the weighting scheme through which they are aggregated into a composite 
measure or series of measures.  It also stresses the need for methodological issues ‘to be 
addressed transparently prior to the construction and use of composite indicators in order to 
avoid data manipulation and misrepresentation’.35  
 
In the approach we have followed, the process of dataset construction consists of the 
following steps: 
 
(i)  identification of a concept which represents the underlying phenomenon of interest  (here, 
‘labour regulation’); 
 
(ii) development of a construct which provides a basis for measuring the concept; 
 
(iii) identification of indicators or variables which express aspects of the construct in 
numerical terms; 
 
(iv) development of a coding algorithm which sets out  a series of steps to be taken in 
assigning numerical values to the primary source material; 
 
(v) identification of a measurement scale which is embedded in the algorithm; 
 
                                                          
31  R. Cooter and T. Ginsberg, Leximetrics: why the same laws are longer in some countries than 
others, working paper NO LE03-012 (2003, University of Illinois College of Law. 
32  P. Lele and  M . Siems, Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach 7 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 17 (2007); Z. Adams and S. Deakin, ‘Quantitative labour law’, in A. Ludlow and A. 
Blackham (eds.) New Frontiers in Empirical Labour Law Research (Hart, 2015). 
 
33  M. Strauss and G. Smith, Construct validity: advances in theory and methodology 5 Annual 
Review of Clinical Psychology 1. 
34  OECD, Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators. Methodology and User Guide (OECD, 
2008), at p. 14. 
35  Ibid., at p. 15. 
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(vi) allocation of weights, where necessary or relevant, to the individual variables or 
indicators;   
 
(vii) aggregation of the individual indicators in an index which provides a composite measure 
of the underlying phenomenon of interest.   
 
Items (i)-(ii) are dealt with in our discussion of the theoretical framework (section 4, below), 
(iii)-(v) in our account of the coding methodology (section 5, below), and issues (vi)-(vii) in 
our discussion of the statistical properties of the dataset and its uses in econometric analysis 
(section 6, below). 
4. Theoretical framework 
 
Datasets coding for legal or institutional data necessarily rest upon theoretical assumptions of 
some kind; the collation and organisation of data do not take place except in response to 
research questions which are generated by theories or models of the world, or by way of 
reference to pressing policy concerns.  The CBR-LRI is a response to the questions raised in 
labour economics and the economics of law concerning the impact of laws and regulations on 
labour market outcomes and, more generally, on the economic performance of firms, sectors 
and nations.   
 
Broadly speaking, the theoretical literature sees a number of possible outcomes of labour 
regulation on the economy, depending on the assumptions made in the underlying model.  
Neoclassical analyses see worker-protective labour laws as an interference with freedom of 
contract and, hence, as a distortion of market outcomes, which are likely to lead to 
involuntary unemployment and a number of other negative effects flowing from the 
misallocation of society’s resources.  By contrast, new-institutionalist approaches see legal 
regulation as countering market failures which are inherent in the operation of the labour 
market, including asymmetric information, and transaction costs arising from the open-ended 
and incomplete nature of the employment contract.36  Post-Keynesian approaches see labour 
regulation as having a number of potentially positive macroeconomic effects, including those 
relating to the management of aggregate demand.37  The view that labour regulations may 
induce firms to manage labour more efficiently and, relatedly, to invest in productivity-
enhancing improvements, has some support among both new-institutionalists38 and post-
Keynesians.39 
 
The CBR-LRI does not assume that any one of these theories is necessarily more correct, in 
the sense of being more likely to be vindicated by evidence, than any of the others. It treats 
the claims they make as hypotheses for empirical testing, any of which could turn out to be 
supported by statistical analyses of the one-way or possibly two-way relationships which 
exist between legal and economic variables.  
                                                          
36  O. Williamson, M. Wachter and J. Harris, Understanding the employment relation: understanding 
the economics of idiosyncratic exchange 6 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 250 
(1975). 
37  A. Dutt, Stagnation, income distribution and ‘monopoly power’, 8 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 8: 25 (1984). 
38  B. Bartling, E. Fehr and K. Schmidt, Use and abuse of authority: a behavioural foundation of the 
employment elation 4 Journal of the European Economic Association, 711 (2013). 
39  E. Stockhammer, Determinants of the wage share: a panel analysis of advanced and developing 
economies British Journal of British Industrial Relations online (2015), doi: 10.1111/bjir.12165. 
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This does not mean that the index is not informed by theory in any way.  The core 
assumption implicit in its design is that regulations governing the employment relationship 
and collective labour relations are capable of affecting labour market outcomes in various 
ways.  The law, together with related regulations with the capacity for normative effect such 
as collective agreements, is not just a filter or proxy for other social forces, but an 
independent causal agent which can change the behaviour of economic and social actors and 
alter structural or aggregate outcomes in the economy.40 
 
We should, however, make an important clarification at this point, which is that the CBR-LRI 
index does not measure ‘costs’, as Botero et al. aim to do,41 nor the ‘strictness’ of rules, as in 
the case of the OECD index,42 nor their ‘rigidity’, as in the case of the World Bank.43 We are 
coding for the presence and qualities of publicly-enunciated legal and regulatory norms.  We 
cannot assume, in the absence of other evidence, that these norms always impose costs on 
firms; they may do, or they may not.44  Nor can we assume that labour laws are effective, in 
practice, in protecting workers.   
 
Since most labour law rules take effect as minimum standards, which may be improved on 
through contracting or collective bargaining, their direct influence on most firms may be 
limited.  It may also be the case that legislative standards replicate norms which the parties 
would have contracted for anyway.  Legal rules may have a number of dynamic effects across 
the economy as a whole, but it is not clear a priori that these will always be harmful from the 
point of view of economic efficiency. Labour law rules may improve efficiency by enabling 
parties to employment contracts to overcome transaction costs and related barriers to 
exchange.45  The use of the terms ‘strictness’ and ‘rigidity’ in the OECD and World Bank 
indices suggests that these measures have built into them an assumption that labour law rules 
necessarily have harmful effects. This makes them of questionable use for testing (as opposed 
to assuming) claims concerning the social and economic impacts of labour laws. 
5. Coding methodology 
 
5.1 Choice of indicators 
 
Five areas of labour law are coded in the CBR-LRI, producing five sub-indices. These are:  
 
(A) the law governing the definition of the employment relationship and different forms of 
employment, including the regulation of the parties’ choice of legal form, and the rules 
relating to part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency work;  
 
(B) the law on working time;  
                                                          
40  For a defence of this position, see S. Deakin, D. Gindis, G., Hodgson, K., Huang, and K. Pistor, K., 
Legal institutionalism: capitalism and the constitutive role of law Journal of Comparative Economics 
online (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016.j.jce.2016.04.005. 
41  The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
42  Venn, Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement, op. cit., n. 3. 
43  Doing Business 2004, op. cit., n. 2. 
44  On this point, see S. Deakin and P. Sarkar, Assessing the long-run economic impact of labour law 
systems: a theoretical reappraisal and analysis of new time series data 39 Industrial Relations Journal 
453 (2008).  
45  Bartling et al., Use and abuse of authority, op. cit., n. 38.  
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(C) the law relating to dismissal;  
 
(D) the law governing employee representation; and  
 
(E) the law relating to industrial action.   
 
These five sub-indices approximately correspond to the categories analysed by Botero et al. 
in their dataset,46 and were chosen, in part, to facilitate comparison between the two indices, 
although with the difference that the CBR index incorporates a time series, whereas Botero et 
al.’s dataset has no longitudinal element.  As we shall explain in more detail below (section 
3.3), the individual coding algorithms in the CBR-LRI are not the same as those used by 
Botero et al., but this does not, in itself, make a comparison inappropriate. 
 
The five sub-indices, in addition to respecting the choice made by Botero et al. in their 
foundational study, reflect the accepted subdivision of the area into individual and collective 
labour law (sub-indices A-C and D-E respectively), and, within those categories, broadly 
follow the ordering of materials presented in labour law textbooks.47 This ordering has, we 
suggest, an inherent logic to it, reflecting the interdependence of the different subdivisions of 
worker-protective labour law rules, in the way they regulate the decision-making powers of 
employers.  
 
Altogether we code for 40 individual indicators.  We could have coded for more rules: for 
example, more detail on shift-work and nightwork in the working time sub-index, and more 
detail on the laws governing discriminatory treatment of trade union members in the 
employee representation sub-index.  However, coding is a resource-intensive process and has 
to stop somewhere. The issue comes down to this: is the choice of indicators sufficiently 
plausible for us to believe that the index scores are a good proxy for the underlying variable 
of interest, the concept we are attempting to measure, labour ‘regulation’?  The complexity of 
that concept, and the multi-faceted nature of the individual rules which feed into it, are such 
that any measure of the kind we have developed would be only an approximation of the 
underlying reality. But this is a feature of all social science datasets, whether they rely on 
content analysis, surveys, fieldwork, or other modes of data collection.  The issue is not 
whether the index is a precise match for social reality, but whether it is a good enough 
approximation, given resource constraints. 
 
5.2 Algorithms and scales 
 
5.2.1 Algorithm design: binary versus graduated coding 
 
Having defined the scope of the index through the identification of the individual indicators 
and their grouping into sub-indices, our next step was to draw up protocols or algorithms for 
each indicator, to ensure that the laws of individual countries were coded as far as possible in 
a consistent way.  There are essentially three approaches which can be taken to this part of 
the data coding process.  The first is to use dummy variables which indicate the presence or 
absence of a particular rule.  Hence a value of 0 can be given if, for example, there is no right 
to reinstatement for unjust dismissal, and a value of 1 if the law in the country in question 
                                                          
46  The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
47  See e.g. S. Deakin and G. Morris, Labour Law 5th. ed. (Hart, 2012). 
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makes reinstatement the normal remedy for an unfair termination.  This approach, which may 
be characterised as ‘binary coding’, is that taken by Botero et al.48 when defining most of the 
variables in their index.  For example, their variable ‘alternative employment contracts’ is 
constructed out of four sub-variables, three of which are dummy variables in this sense: 
 
 (1) a dummy variable equal to one if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of 
full-time workers, (2) a dummy variable equal to one if terminating part-time workers 
is at least as costly as terminating full-time workers, (3) a dummy variable equal to one 
if fixed-term contracts are allowed only for fixed-term tasks, and (4) the normalised 
maximum duration of fixed-term contracts.49 
 
The second approach is to find a law which can be expressed in numerical terms, such as the 
fourth sub-variable set out above which is described in years and months, and to normalise 
the score using a standard scale, such as 0 to 1.  The third approach is to use graduated scores 
which express the strength with which the law of a given country regulates employer power 
or, conversely, protects employee interests.   
 
The CBR index makes use of all three approaches but predominantly uses the third.  
Graduated coding allows for a more fine-grained analysis, which is capable of capturing a 
greater variety of cross-national differences than is the case with the use of dummy variables.  
The second option, normalisation of numerical values derived from the original law, is 
possible only in a minority of cases (predominantly involving working time standards or 
qualifying thresholds expressed in weeks, months or years). 
 
5.2.2. Retrieving primary data  
 
The primary data on which the values in the CBR-LRI are based are the laws and regulations 
of various countries.  To complete the coding, we accessed original materials at source, that 
is, in the form of statutes and other legislative materials (decrees, orders and ordinances), and, 
where relevant, case law.  These primary legal texts were read, wherever possible, in their 
original language or in an official English translation.   For most countries it was possible to 
retrieve texts from online sources, including the ILO’s NATLEX database of labour 
legislation,50 and country-level legal databases.  Although accessing repealed statutes and 
superseded versions of labour codes was not always straightforward, it was generally possible 
to find original texts or to reconstruct their contents by consulting textbooks and secondary 
sources.  Textbooks were also consulted to clarify accepted interpretations of legal texts.  In 
cases of uncertainty over the meaning of an original or translated text, or where no official 
translation was available, advice was sought from country-level experts.   
 
It may be argued that centralising the coding process in this way is likely to result in 
misunderstandings or misinterpretations of local laws, and that a better approach would be to 
work with a country expert in each case and to use their codings.  This approach may work 
with a relatively small number of countries,51 but it becomes problematic in resource terms 
when rolled out on the scale of a dataset coding for over 100 countries.   
                                                          
48  The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
49  Ibid., at p. 1348. 
50 Available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.home?p_lang=en (accessed 11 December 2016). 
51  As in the studies by P. Lele and M. Siems, M. Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach 7 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17 (2007), and M. Siems, Shareholder protection around the world 
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There is also the issue of introducing potential inconsistencies into the codings.  As Holger 
Spamann explains, in the context of his re-coding of La Porta et al.’s index of shareholder 
protection laws, involving foreign lawyers in the coding: 
 
does not solve the problem of classifying the foreign law, i.e., of providing a workable 
variable definition and ensuring its consistent application. In fact, it may make these 
matters worse. First of all, the introduction of an intermediary between the foreign law 
and the quantitative researcher creates the novel problem that the intermediary may 
misunderstand the question. Second, even if the question is understood correctly, there 
is the risk that each foreign lawyer will fill in gaps in the definitions of terms used in a 
question according to her own priors… Without some feedback loop that ensures that 
the many gap-filling needs will be addressed centrally and hence uniformly for all 
countries, inconsistent coding is almost certain to occur. This requires that one person, 
or a group of closely communicating persons, centralizes the coding process.52  
 
Thus where we consulted experts in the laws of particular countries we did so in order to 
clarify our understanding of the underlying law, not for the purpose of getting their 
assessment of the appropriate score for their country: in order to maintain consistent coding, 
all the scores in the index were arrived at by the central team. 
 
5.2.3 Coding for different sources of labour law: court decisions, statutes, and collective 
agreeements 
 
Although in civil law countries court decisions are not regarded as a source of law, they were 
taken into account in the coding because they often, in practice, produce a rule or norm which 
is as important as a statutory provision.  Statutory law was coded in the year in which it came 
into force and case law was coded in the year in which judgments were reported. Statutes 
passed but not yet in force or decisions which are unpublished or unavailable were not coded.    
 
In line with the approach also adopted by Botero et al.,53 sources such as administrative 
regulation and collective agreements were included where they could be regarded as 
‘functional equivalents’ to statutes or court decisions.  However, these sources are not coded 
unless they are designed to have some external binding force on the enterprise.  Thus sector-
level collective agreements are coded where the standards they contain have an erga omnes 
effect as a result, for example, of extension legislation.   
 
5.2.4 Mandatory and default rules 
 
The index takes into account both mandatory and default rules, but with a reduction in the 
score to indicate the non-binding nature of the latter.  Default rules are rules that apply unless 
the parties to an agreement (collective or individual) contract out of them.  Where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Leximetric II) 33 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 111 (2008). 
 
52 H. Spamann, On the insignificance and/or endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director Rights 
Index’ under consistent coding John M. Ohlin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard 
University, Discussion Paper No. 7/2006, at pp. 18-19. 
53 The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
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conditions for contracting out are strict, a score closer to 1 is given.  Where opting out is 
straightforward, a score closer to 0.5 or below is given. 
 
5.2.5 Federal systems 
 
In some of the countries coded labour law does not operate in a uniform way, for instance if it 
is a federal state. In these cases, the law for the commercially or industrially dominant sub-
unit of that state, (the unit where the most significant firms are based) is coded, or, failing 
that, the federal-level law, or in appropriate cases, a mixture of the two.  
 
5.2.6 Focus on particular worker and enterprise types 
 
The dataset in principle codes for the law as it applies to an indeterminate (or ‘permanent’) 
employment relationship, except in the case of the variables in the first sub-index (different 
forms of employment) where the focus is on the regulation of the parties’ choice of legal 
form (employment versus self-employment) and in the regulatory costs and benefits attached 
to employment relationships of different types (part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency 
work).  Where laws differ in their effects according to the size and location of the enterprise, 
the coding is based on the rules which apply in the default or standard case, that is, 
enterprises or workplaces at or above generally-applicable size thresholds.  Where different 
standards are set for different groups of workers, such as white-collar and blue-collar 
workers, the dataset codes for the minimal or less protective standards.  We do not report 
different results according to firm size or worker category but the coding algorithms could be 
applied to generate separate sets of scores along these lines for particular countries, and this is 
a matter to which we can in return in future. 
 
5.2.7 Text-based versus opinion-based coding, and the gap between law ‘in the books’ 
and ‘law in action’ 
 
Could the coding of the CBR-LRI have been done more efficiently by avoiding a text-based 
analysis altogether, and relying on surveys and opinion polls, as is the case with some other 
indices?  The values contained in the World Bank’s Labour Market Regulation dataset are 
based largely on returns made by law firms and other business actors.54  The scores are a 
hybrid of these actors’ understandings of the law and their perceptions of how it operates in 
practice.  The OECD’s Employment Protection Indicators appear to be based on a similar 
mix of opinion-based and text-based sources, with the latter apparently becoming more 
prominent as a source of codings over time.  From 2013 the OECD has published online 
explanations for its scores based on legal texts.55 This documentation does not explain how 
earlier versions of the index were coded, so it is not possible to determine how the scores 
provided for earlier periods were arrived at. 
 
One advantage of using opinion-based coding is that some account can be taken of the way 
the law works in practice.  The CBR-LRI, as it depends entirely on a text-based analysis, can 
                                                          
54  For the most recent version of the World Bank’s labour regulation datasets, and an explanation of 
the methodology used to construct them, see World Bank, Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunities 
for All (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2016), ‘Annex: Labor Market 
Regulation’, at pp. 87-95.  
55  OECD, Detailed description of employment protection legislation, 2012-13, OECD countries, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/All.pdf, accessed 11 December 2016. 
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only capture the ‘law in the books’, not ‘law in action’.  A practical reason for not using 
opinion-based coding in the case of the CBR-LRI, however, is that it would be hard to get 
meaningful estimates of the perceived strength of the law in practice for the historical 
periods, going back to the 1970s, which the dataset codes for. 
 
There are other problems with surveys and polls.  The OECD relies on returns from 
governmental officials, and the World Bank on information provided by law firms and other 
commercial entities.  This is, in each case, a narrow knowledge base to draw from.  Widening 
the constituency of respondents to include other actors, such as NGOs and trade unions, or 
academic experts, could be done, but efforts would have to be made to ensure that the 
samples chosen were representative.  Unless underlying polling data are made available, all 
such data suffer from a transparency problem and run the risk of subjectivity bias.  Thus it is 
not clear that opinion-based coding produces results which are more accurate than those 
based on textual analysis.    
 
The text-based approach adopted in the construction of the CBR-LRI means that its potential 
value as a measure of the wider social and economic significance of labour laws could be 
criticised as limited by comparison to surveys (where they are appropriately conducted) of 
the law in practice.  More generally, labour lawyers and others may be sceptical of the 
relevance of the scores reported in the CBR-LRI, given the high likelihood that labour law 
rules are not translated fully into practice, in particular for smaller enterprises, and in the 
context of national systems with limited regulatory capacity. 
 
We acknowledge this problem, but we think that the answer it not to mix up text-based 
coding with polling or survey evidence. When this happens, as appears to have been the case 
with the OECD and World Bank datasets, it becomes impossible to disentangle how far a 
given score is caused by the content of the rule and how far it is determined by weaknesses in 
the enforcement or observance of the law.  It is essential in the construction of an index of 
this kind not to mix up law and practice.56 
 
Nor is it appropriate for the scores in the index to be adjusted downwards in an 
impressionistic way, based on an intuitive sense of the extent to which labour law rules 
operate well or badly in a given country setting. In the course of presenting the dataset at 
workshops and conferences we have sometimes been told that the score we have accorded to 
a given country’s laws does not accord with the impression that a lawyer or social scientist 
from that country has of the strength of that law in practice.  While a score should be changed 
if it turns out not to reflect an accurate understanding of the underling law, or because the 
algorithm has been misapplied, we do not think that it is appropriate to alter values on the 
basis of subjective impressions, no matter how far they may reflect the experiences of those 
working in a particular system, since unless this type of adjustment is made on a systematic 
basis, it will simply import new biases and inconsistencies into the coding. 
 
A better solution is to adjust the scores in the CBR index using other data sources, in 
particular those which provide information on the legitimacy of legal rules and on the 
effectiveness of legal institutions in practice, to get a fully-rounded picture of the functioning 
of labour laws in a given country. Thus the World Bank’s Rule of Law index, part of its 
                                                          
56  Spamann, On the insignificance endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’, op. 
cit. n. 52, at p. 10. 
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wider set of governance-related datasets,57 can be used to adjust the scores in the CBR-LRI. 
This is available on a longitudinal basis, as are the indicators of legal and political rights 
developed by the Freedom House NGO.58  Separating legal and institutional data in this way 
makes it possible to disentangle the effects of labour law rules in and of themselves from the 
wider context of respect for the rule of law and observance of law in a particular country 
setting.  This is not possible with the hybridised approach used by the World Bank and 
OECD. 
6. Statistical properties of the dataset 
 
6.1 Weighting and aggregation 
 
The data in the CBR-LRI are presented in such a way that it is possible to identify the score 
for each individual indicator by year and country.59  Thus researchers can analyse the data at 
various levels of aggregation, and can choose to create composite indices from the individual 
indicators, as they wish. It is open to them to assign weights to individual indicators or 
categories of indicators and choose from various methods of aggregation to arrive at a 
composite measure.  In this section we discuss some of the weighting options. 
 
If the scores from individual indicators are aggregated or averaged without any weighting at 
all, the implicit assumption is that each indicator is of equal weight or ’importance’ in 
arriving at the overall measure.  This assumption can be analysed by reference to the 
theoretical priors and design principles underlying the construction of the coding algorithms.  
 
From the point of view of these theoretical priors, our suggestion is that researchers should 
only depart from the assumption that all the indicators are of equal weight if there is a 
compelling reason do so.  This is because the indicators have been designed to capture 
distinct but interlocking aspects of the way labour law rules work in practice. 
 
The principle that each indicator is distinct from all the others is another way of saying that 
they have been designed so as not to overlap, thereby avoiding double counting.  Thus the 
rule governing the length of the qualifying period needed to obtain basic protection against 
unjust dismissal, and the rule setting out the normal remedy for unjust dismissal, contribute to 
worker protection in two distinct ways.  This justifies the design decision of allocating these 
two distinct rules to two separate indicators (CBR indicators 18 and 21 respectively). 
 
Conversely, a single indicator may be used to capture two rules which are distinct in their 
form but largely equivalent in their effects.   Thus CBR indicator 18 ‘measures the period of 
service required before a worker qualifies for general protection against unjust dismissal’.  In 
some countries this rules is referred to as a ‘probation period’ and in others as a ‘qualifying 
period’.  For our purposes, both, potentially, have the same effect, namely of delaying the 
                                                          
57  See D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VII: aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for 1996-2007, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654 (2008). 
58 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016, available at https://freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-world, accessed 11 December 2016. 
59  The dataset, together with the metadata and codebook setting out the coding algorithms and 
primary sources for the codings, are available at 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256566, accessed 11 December 2016. 
 
 
16 
 
point at which the individual worker is protected against unjust dismissal.  We are concerned 
here with substance, not form.  Thus these rules are coded by reference to a single variable.  
Coding them separately would give rise to the risk of double counting for the same rule. 
 
The principle underlying the grouping of indicators into sub-indices is that the rules they code 
for interlock to achieve labour law protection.  Thus the sub-index on dismissal law is the 
sum of individual rules which interlock to achieve worker protection in the area of 
termination of employment.  The degree of protection a worker enjoys is the result of 
numerous inter-related rules: the length of any probation or qualifying period, the length of 
notice to be given prior to dismissal, the need for notification of dismissal, the rules 
governing procedural and substantive fairness, the rules governing redundancy selection, 
compensation and re-employment, and the remedies for dismissal.  These rules do not operate 
in isolation but form linked parts of the systemic whole, ‘dismissal law’.  Because they work 
together to produce an overall level of protection for workers, it is meaningful to group them 
together to form a single sub-index.  Similarly, the individual sub-indices are distinct from 
each other but sum to form, we would suggest, a more or less coherent view of the overall 
regulatory impact of labour law as a whole in a given country.   
 
Thus the possibility of aggregation is built into the design of the index.  Combinations of 
indicators other than those suggested by the grouping of the indicators into the five sub-
categories are entirely possible, and it is open to researchers to suggest others, but they would 
need to be justified by an underlying theory of how labour law rules interlock in practice. 
 
Does the design of the index also justify equal weighting?  If each indicator represents a rule 
which contributes to the systemic effect of the whole, and if we have avoided double 
counting, we should operate on a presumption of equal weighting, unless we have grounds 
for departing from that view.   
 
The presumption of equal weighting may be departed from where certain variables of interest 
are more complex to express than others, and so are captured in a greater number of 
individual indicators.  Thus across the index as a whole, there are slightly more indicators in 
some sub-indices than others.  This problem can be remedied by presenting composite scores 
for the index as a whole in the form of an average of the five sub-indices, as opposed to the 
average of the 40 indicators.  In practice, as the numbers of individual indicators do not very 
greatly across the sub-indices, the different magnitudes are very small.   
 
There may also be a case for adjusting the weights attached to certain individual indicators 
within sub-indices. For the most part, one indicator is sufficient to express the relevant 
underlying variable, but sometimes this is not the case.  Thus in sub-index A (different forms 
of employment), only one indicator is used to express the variable relating to the choice 
between self-employment and subordinated labour, but two are used to express the rules 
relating to part-time work and agency work respectively, and three are used to express the 
rules relating to the use of fixed-term contracts.  Again, this problem could be solved through 
simple re-averaging to achieve parity between the different categories (self-employment, 
part-time work, fixed-term employment and agency work). Quantitatively, however, the 
effects of this kind of reweighting are very small, so the problem is not a very significant one 
in practice. 
 
A separate issue is whether the weights attached to individual indicators, or of particular sub-
indices, should be altered, in order to reflect the significance which a given area of law might 
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be assumed to have within a particular national legal system.  Thus it could be the case, for 
example,  that sub-index (D), employee representation, should be given proportionately more 
weight in the case of Germany than sub-index (E), strike law, given the pivotal importance 
attached to the institution of codetermination (as captured in sub-index (D)) in the German 
system.  Similar conjectures could be suggested for every country.  However, that is all they 
are: conjectures.  Without a clear justification for introducing such weights, the likelihood is 
that applying this approach would introduce a high degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness 
into the dataset. This is not to say that some re-weighting could not be done on a cross-
country or time-variant basis if relevant data to justify that weighting were available for a 
particular country or period. This is a decision to be made by each researcher and justified 
accordingly.  As the dataset is reported without weights, it can be straightforwardly adapted 
or adjusted according to particular weighting schemes in future, where a case can be made for 
them.  
 
6.2 Covariance and latent structure of data 
 
A somewhat different approach to understanding the dataset is to examine it from the point of 
view of its internal statistical properties, that is, to see whether a statistical analysis can reveal 
patterns or structures which are not apparent from a consideration of the dataset’s theoretical 
priors.  A first step is to undertake a correlation analysis to determine the degree of 
covariance across particular indicators or groups of indicators. Table 1 reports correlations, 
for the dataset as a whole (all countries and all years), between the five sub-indices and two 
versions of the aggregate score, one based on an equal weighting of the 40 indicators, and 
which takes the average of the sub-indices (this addresses the point, discussed in subsection 
6.1 above, concerning the unequal number of indicators in the different sub-indices).  The 
Table shows that there is a positive correlation between each of sub-indices and the overall 
score, and that all these coefficients fall more or less in the range between 0.6 and 0.7.  
 
Table 1 is reported here only as an exercise in illustration, as an ‘overall’ correlation between 
all countries and time periods does not, in itself, tell us very much.  If, for example, labour 
law in one country in 1990 turned out to be correlated with that in another country in 2005, 
we would need to do further work to identify the possible channels at work, which could 
include trade, globalization, or harmonisation initiatives. This is a matter for future research. 
 
------------------------- 
 
Table 1 here 
 
------------------------- 
 
A correlation analysis tells us whether two variables have a linear relationship with one 
another and whether they both lie on the same side of the mean (if the correlation is positive) 
or opposite sides (if it is negative).  What would we be learning if we saw that there was a 
high and positive correlation between the scores for variables 18 (qualifying period) and 21 
(reinstatement)?   This would mean that across a group of countries or for an individual 
country as the case might be, a shorter qualifying period tended to go hand in hand with a 
more worker-protective remedy.   We could then describe the two rules as mutually 
reinforcing modes of achieving worker protection. What would we conclude if, on the other 
hand, we observed negative correlations between two variables? This would not be grounds 
for thinking that the coding algorithm had been badly designed.  It would simply show that in 
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a group of countries, or in a single country, a policy decision had been made to trade off a 
wide scope of protection (if the qualifying period was short) against a less worker-protective 
remedy (if compensation was favoured over reinstatement).  Either outcome is possible, 
depending on the policy choices made in particular countries. 
 
Nor does the presence of negative correlations between two variables imply that aggregating 
them is unsound.   The two rules would, in principle, be offsetting each other.  The aggregate 
score for a country where this is occurring should, if the coding is to be consistent, be lower 
than it would be in a country where both indicators were on the same side of their mean.  For 
example, it is possible that policy makers in a given country might have decided for strong 
remedies for employees unjustly dismissed but to ration access to this protection by imposing 
a lengthy qualifying or probation period.  In that case the overall score for dismissal 
protection would, correctly, be lower than it would be if a strong remedy were combined with 
a short qualifying or probation period. 
 
Thus the results reported in Table 1, while of interest, are only the starting point for further 
analysis. The preponderance of positive correlations tells us that, across all countries and 
periods, labour law rules tend to reinforce each other, but it is entirely possible that when we 
drill down to the level of individual regions or countries, or to certain time periods, we would 
see different patterns, which could reveal trade-offs of various kinds.  This is a matter for 
future work. 
 
A further step would be to undertake a statistical analysis designed to reveal latent features of 
the dataset, such as factor analysis or principal component analysis.  These techniques can be 
used to identify individual variables, or combinations of variables, which capture overall 
variances in the data for a particular sub-index or for the dataset as a whole.  The purpose of 
doing this is to identify a core set of indicators that better captures the variance in the 
underlying phenomenon of interest, in the sense of doing so more parsimoniously, thereby 
making it possible to get a clearer result when regressing the scores in the index against 
potential outcomes variables such as indicators of employment or productivity.60  
 
A drawback with this approach is that components of variables identified in this way may 
make no theoretical sense.  In other words, the components might not represent any tangible 
law or policy, but could be an artificial result of the way the dataset has been constructed.  
Such components would be drawing on laws whose association was a purely statistical 
artefact which bore no relationship to the way rules interacted with each other in practice.  
Where that was the case, the component would have limited (if any) usability in formal 
modelling.  
 
It may be that principal component analysis can be used in future to refine the study of the 
dataset. This issue is best addressed at the stage of econometric analysis of particular 
countries or groups of countries, rather than at the level of dataset design.  We confine our 
discussion here to making the point that the dataset has been constructed in such a way as to 
capture a series of linkages across indicators, which are represented by their grouping into the 
five sub-indices.  If associations of variables arrived at through factor analysis or principal 
component analysis are to be used in econometric studies, they should, we suggest, be 
justified on theoretical grounds. The presentation of components or clusters without reference 
                                                          
60 See OECD, Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators, op. cit. n. 34. 
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to underlying theories runs the risk of giving undue attention to groupings of indicators which 
may be nothing more than statistical artefacts.  
 
6.3 Tends in labour regulation revealed by the dataset  
 
The longitudinal dimension of the CBR-LRI makes it possible to capture dynamic effects 
which are not observable in the cross-sectional dataset constructed by Botero et al.61  Figure 1 
illustrates trends over time in the form of density estimations, for the index as a whole. It 
shows that for each of four years chosen at roughly equal intervals (1970, 1986, 2000 and 
2013), there is a non-skewed distribution of scores, and that there has been an increase in 
protection as indicated by the rightward shift in the distribution over time.   
 
 
------------------------- 
 
Figure 1 here 
  
------------------------- 
 
When we look at areas of law over time we can observe, again, an increase in overall levels 
of protection, but variations over time in the relative degrees of protection provided by 
different regulatory instruments (Figure 2).  Thus in 1970 the working time category of laws 
had a higher score than the other four, which had a more or less similar profile.  By 2013, the 
industrial action category had become the area with the lowest score.  This suggests that, over 
time, there has been something of a move away from collective labour law to individual 
labour law as the preferred mode of protection, but the difference is not huge and is relative, 
not absolute, as the level of protection in the industrial action category had been increasing 
over time, just not as quickly as in the case of the other groupings of variables.    
 
------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 here 
  
------------------------- 
 
The dataset can also be used to compare trends in regions across time.  Figure 3 shows that in 
1970 the most protective region was Latin America, but that by 2013 it had been displaced in 
this respect by the European Union.  North America was by some distance the least protective 
region throughout the period, reflecting the very low scores attributed to the USA; Canada 
had somewhat higher, but still below average, scores.  Asia was more protective than North 
America in each of the four years but below Africa.  Each of the five regions experienced 
increasing protection over time. 
 
------------------------- 
 
Figure 3 here 
  
------------------------- 
                                                          
61 The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
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Finally, we can compare the position of common law and civil law countries.  Botero et al’s 
cross-sectional data for the late 1990s found that ‘legal origin matters for several areas of 
labor law’,62 with civil law origin systems reporting higher scores than common law ones.  
From Figure 4 we can see that the CBR-LRI data report a similar gaps between the common 
law and civil law at both the beginning and of the period covered by the dataset, with the civil 
law remaining more protective, on average, than the common law, throughout the period 
covered by the dataset.  
 
 
------------------------- 
 
Figure 4 here 
  
------------------------- 
 
Reporting averages for countries by region, level of development and legal origin may give a 
misleading picture, in so far it might be read as implying a degree of homogeneity across 
these categories which is simply the result of averaging. When we look at the experience of 
individual countries, we see, firstly, enormous heterogeneity across systems, and also over 
time.  Figure 5 shows the time trends for six developed countries.  From this it can be seen 
that France, Sweden and Germany had much higher scores than the United States throughout 
the period between 1970 and 2013.  This chart also shows that some countries experience 
considerable shifts in the level of worker protection over time; the UK, in particular, 
underwent a major transformation in its labour law regime, towards becoming less worker-
protective, in the 1980s, and then experienced a more incremental revival of protection in the 
1990s and 2000s.  Figure 6 presents data for the five BRICS countries, and indicates, again, 
considerable heterogeneity of experience as well as shifts over time, with the increase in 
regulation in China after 2008 a marked trend. 
 
------------------------- 
 
Figures 5 and 6 here 
  
------------------------- 
 
Detailed analysis of the trends in the dataset is a matter for future research, but it is already 
clear that it may prompt some reconsideration of the way in which developments in labour 
law are described. In particular, we do not observe the clear declines in protection which 
might have been expected from accounts of the impact on labour law of trends which include 
the rise in new forms of employment.  We do not see, for example, a reduction in the 
protection afforded to workers in different forms of employment over time.  On the contrary, 
as the numbers employed in part-time, fixed-term and agency work have been rising, 
countries have responded by passing laws to protect workers in these forms of work, by, for 
example, tightening the conditions under which they may be used, or requiring that they be 
treated in an equal or proportionate way with workers in so-called ‘standard’ (that is, full-
time, indeterminate-duration) employment.  This trend is particularly visible in the case of 
European Union countries, in part as a result of the adoption of the directives on part-time 
                                                          
62 The regulation of labor, op. cit. n. 1. 
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work and fixed-term employment in the 1990s and of the directive on temporary agency work 
in 2008.  However, the trend is not confined to the global north, as China and South Africa 
are among middle-income countries to adopt laws more tightly regulating fixed-term and 
temporary agency work since the mid-2000s.63 
 
Nor do the data show that labour laws across the world have been in decline as a result of the 
adoption since the onset of the global financial crisis of policies of structural adjustment or 
fiscal consolidation.  Even within the EU, where policies of fiscal consolidation have been 
pursued since the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2008, the deregulatory impact of these 
policies on labour laws has been confined to the subset of countries which have received debt 
relief and have, as a consequence, been required to loosen controls over dismissals and over 
the use by employers of different forms of employment.   
 
Some caveats are in order. First, to repeat a point already made, the dataset only reports 
changes in formal law.  It does not capture cross-country differences in the effectiveness of 
laws in practice; nor is it reporting trends in the wider economy, such as falling union density 
and collective bargaining coverage, which may have had a significant impact on the relative 
bargaining power of labour and capital.  Nor does the CBR-LRI capture changes occurring in 
other areas of law, such as shareholder protection laws, which have empowered capital at the 
expense of labour.  Studying potential interactions between labour regulation and these wider 
economic and legal developments is a matter for future research. 
 
6.4 Potential uses of the CBR-LRI in econometric analysis 
 
The most distinctive feature of the CBR-LRI, when compared to other indices, is the lengthy, 
continuous and internally consistent times series which it provides. This makes it possible to 
analyse relationships in a way which is not possible with static, cross-sectional analyses, and 
to distinguish between the short-run and long-run effects of changes in regulation.   
 
Because, as we have seen, the CBR-LRI measures de jure regulation, its use in isolation from 
other data may give a misleading picture of the practical operation of labour laws.  Thus it 
should be used in conjunction with data on the legitimacy or effectiveness of laws in practice, 
such as those derived from the World Bank’s governance indices, the rule of law project of 
the World Justice Project, or rule of law data from think tanks such as Freedom House.   
 
While new opportunities for econometric analysis arise, certain constraints also need to be 
borne in mind.  Where data in long time series are non-stationary, co-integration techniques 
should generally be deployed to deal with the possibility of spurious correlations.64  In 
addition, the results obtained from time-series analysis of the CBR-LRI are likely to be 
sensitive to the length of the lags chosen to capture the delayed effects of legal change.  Thus 
the choice of lag may need careful justification.  The same point applies to the selection of 
controls and to use of any instrumental variables.    
 
                                                          
63  Because of space constraints, we refer the reader to the metadata accompanying the dataset which 
may be consulted online (https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256566, accessed 11 
December 2016). 
64  For discussion, see Deakin and Sarkar, Assessing the long-run economic impact of labour law 
systems, op. cit., n. 44. 
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Notwithstanding these caveats, the CBR-LRI has already been used in a number of 
exploratory econometric studies, using relatively small samples compared to the current 
extent of the dataset, to explore the relationship between labour regulation, on the one hand, 
and relevant economic variables, including employment, productivity and inequality, on the 
other.  The techniques so far used include difference-in-differences models,65 autoregressive 
distributive lag approaches,66 vector autoregression and vector error correction models,67 
fixed-effects and random-effects models,68 and dynamic panel data analysis.69  It is not our 
intention to review this emerging body of evidence here; it is too early to say what the 
current, expanded form of the dataset may be able to tell us.  Our view is that there is nothing 
in the design of the dataset that makes it inherently more or less likely to favour a particular 
normative position on the desirability, from either an efficiency or a fairness perspective, of 
labour law protections. 
7. Conclusion 
 
Whether worker-protective labour laws cause unemployment, how far they improve 
employee well-being, and whether they contribute to rising or falling inequality, are pressing 
policy issues.  Without good data on variations in the content of labour law rules across 
countries and over time it will be very difficult to get reliable answers to these questions. The 
task of collating data on legal systems in a form appropriate for statistical analysis is far from 
straightforward.  In this paper we have sought to show that coding techniques can be used to 
construct legal datasets which are transparent and capable of being externally validated.  The 
problems inherent in the construction of datasets based on composite indices can be, if not 
entirely overcome, then at least significantly minimised, if researchers take a number of 
steps: these include being clear about theoretical priors, making coding choices explicit, 
reporting primary sources in full, and setting out the bases for aggregation and weighting of 
data.    
 
In this paper, we have described the process underlying the construction of a dataset which 
follows these precepts, the CBR-LRI.  The dataset codes for the labour laws of 117 countries 
over the period 1970-2013. It provides a continuous time series of changes in labour law rules 
covering five areas: different forms of employment, working time, dismissal, employee 
representation, and industrial action.  It can be used in time series analysis to explore issues 
which until now have been largely inaccessible to empirical research. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  CBR-LRI, trends in overall labour protection, 1970-2013, kernel density estimations.   
 
Note 
 
The horizontal analysis indicates values of indicators contained in the CBR-LRI Dataset, and the 
vertical axis indicates probability density functions, that is, the likelihood of an indicator chosen at 
random having a value in the sample space indicated.   
 
Source 
 
CBR-LRI Index, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256566. 
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Figure 2. Trends in labour law by sub-categories of legal regulation, 1970-2013, kernel density 
estimations (for explanation and source see Figure 1). 
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Figure 3. Trends in labour law in different regions, 1970-2013, kernel density estimations (for 
explanation and source see Figure 1). 
  
0
2
4
6
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Overall Protection (CBR-LRI)
Africa EU
Asia NA
Latin
Year 1986
0
2
4
6
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Overall Protection (CBR-LRI)
Africa EU
Asia NA
Latin
Year 2000
0
2
4
6
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Overall Protection (CBR-LRI)
Africa EU
Asia NA
Latin
Year 2008
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Overall Protection (CBR-LRI)
Africa EU
Asia NA
Latin
Year 2013
26 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Trends in labour law by country grouping according to legal origin, 1970- 2013, kernel 
density estimations (for explanation and source see Figure 1). 
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Figure 5a. Trends in labour regulation (overall protection) in six OECD countries, 1970-2013 (for 
source see Figure 1). 
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Figure 5b. Trends in labour regulation (DFE, Working time, Dismissal, Employee Rep, and Industrial 
Action) in six OECD countries, 1970-2013 (for source see Figure 1). 
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Figure 6a. Trends in labour regulation (overall protection) in five BRICS countries, 1970-2013 (for 
source see Figure 1). 
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Figure 6b. Trends in labour regulation (DFE, Working time, Dismissal, Employee Rep, and Industrial 
Action) in five BRICS countries, 1970-2013 
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Table 1: Labour law, all sub-indices, correlation matrix 
 
 DFE Working 
time 
Dismissal Employee 
representation 
Industrial 
action 
All All 
reaveraged 
DFE 1.0000       
Working time 0.3099 1.0000      
Dismissal 0.3426 0.3060 1.0000     
Employee representation 0.3544 0.2132 0.2874 1.0000    
Industrial action 0.2318 0.1382 0.2294 0.3148 1.0000   
All 0.7009 0.5569 0.6800 0.6676 0.6232 1.0000  
All reaveraged 0.7052 0.5840 0.6569 0.6939 0.5941 0.9980 1.0000 
 
Source: CBR-LRI Index, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256566. 
         
